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COMMENT

IMPOSING CRIMINAL LIABILITY ON THOSE WHO
KNOWINGLY TRANSMIT THE AIDS VIRUS: A
RECOMMENDATION FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The controversy surrounding AIDS 1 is not confined to the medical
arena; a number of serious social and legal issues have been raised by
this health risk as well. 2 Because of the circumstances surrounding the
contraction of the disease by its first known victims,3 many have been
slow to sympathize with, and quick to condemn, those suffering from
AIDS." Discrimination against carriers of the AIDS virus exists in our
workplaces, 5 schools, 6 and communities. 7 The public response to the
threat of death from AIDS 8 ranges from intensive educational pro-

"AIDS" is an acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. See generally U.S.
AIDS (1987) [hereinafter FACTS
ABOUT AIDS] (fact sheet detailing basic information about AIDS, including "the risk of contracting AIDS, the actions individuals can take to reduce spreading AIDS, and current research
and related activities under way in the Public Health Service").
2. One physician has noted that "[f]rom the outset it has been impossible to deal with
AIDS only in the context of the natural sciences because of the intimate admixture of issues
involving sociology, psychology, politics, ethics and the law." Osborn, The AIDS Epidemic: An
Overview of the Science, 1986 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 40, 41.
3. Id. at 42 (noting that the first known AIDS victims were homosexual males); see also
Robinson, AIDS and the Criminal Law: Traditional Approaches and a New Statutory Proposal,
14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 95 (1985) (stating that as of 1985, "[alpproximately three out of four
American AIDS patients [were] homosexual males").
4. See The Backlash Builds Against AIDS, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 4, 1985, at 9.
5. See Hackett, I Want Him Crucified, NEWSWEEK. Oct. 5, 1987, at 36 (pediatrician loses
practice after testing positive for AIDS); Pave, Fear and Loathing in the Workplace: What Managers Can Do About AIDS, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 25, 1985, at 126.
6. See Conant, AIDS in the Classroom, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 1986, at 6 ( preliminary injunction barred 14-year-old AIDS victim, Ryan White, from attending public school in Kokomo,
Indiana); Voboril, The Castaways: Fear About AIDS Drives 3 Boys from Home, LIFE. Oct. 1987,
at 98, 99-100 (family home burned in Arcadia, Florida because child had AIDS) ; As AIDS
Spooks the Schoolroom, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 23, 1985, at 7. See generally Freedman, Wrong Without Remedy, A.B.A. J.. June 1, 1986, at 36, 37-40; Kaus, Drew, Hutchinson &
Robins, No Escaping; Dilemma of Kids with AIDS in School, NEWSWEEK. Sept. 7, 1987, at 52.
7. Freedman, supra note 6, at 37 ("The disease has provoked a deep emotional response in
those places where members of high-risk groups live, work and attend school.").
8. Id. at 36. More than 85% of those who develop AIDS will never recover from the disI.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FACTS ABOUT
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gramming on how to avoid what has been called "the plague" 9 of the
Eighties to demands by lawmakers for the imposition of criminal sanctions upon those responsible for the knowing transmission of the virus."
Given the climate of fear 1" surrounding this health threat, it is
imperative that legislators draft clearly defined, rational guidelines regarding the imposition of criminal liability upon those who knowingly
transmit the AIDS virus. This comment explores the options available
to and the obstacles confronting legislators in drafting such legislation.
The comment begins with a basic medical explanation of AIDS, including a discussion of the difference between the AIDS virus and the
AIDS disease. The article continues with a description of common- law
and statutory methods available for imposing liability upon those who
transmit diseases. Then, it undertakes an analysis of the law applicable
to the AIDS epidemic in particular. The comment concludes with suggestions for criminal legislation directed towards those who knowingly
transmit the AIDS virus.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

AIDS: Basic Medical Considerations

It is estimated that, since 1981, the number of AIDS cases has
doubled every six months. 2 The disease is caused by a virus, which has
been referred to by various names: "human T-lymphotropic virus, type
III (HTLV-III); lymphadenopathy associated virus (LAV); . . .
AIDS-related retrovirus (ARV); . . . [and] human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV)."' 3 The virus attacks the body's immune system, leaving
the individual defenseless against opportunistic infections such as
pneumocystis carinii pneumonia and Kaposi's Sarcoma.' Pneumocystis
carinii pneumonia is the more serious of the two illnesses, resulting in

ease. Osborn, supra note 2, at 43. "Full-Blown" AIDS causes a breakdown in an individual's
immune system, and is evidenced by resulting opportunistic infections. FACTS ABOUT AIDS, supra
note I, at 4-5. Infection with the AIDS virus, though, does not always result in the disease. Id. at
3.
9. See, e.g., Morrow, The Start of a Plague Mentality, TIME, Sept. 23, 1985, at 92;
Ohlendorf, Breakthrough Against a Modern Plague. MACLEAN'S. Feb. 4, 1985, at 47; Trafford &
Carey, Behind Spreading Fear of Two Modern 'Plagues,' U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 12,
1985, at 46, 47.
10. Freedman, supra note 6, at 37.
II. Id.; see also Lacayo, Assault With a Deadly Virus, TIME, July 20, 1987, at 63.
12. Osborn, supra note 2, at 43.
13. FACTS ABOUT AIDS, supra note I, at 3.
14. Comment, You Never Told Me . . . You Never Asked: Tort Liability for the Sexual
Transmission of AIDS, 91 DICK. L. REV. 529, 531 (1986). Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia is a
parasitic infection of the lungs and Kaposi's Sarcoma is a type of cancer. FACTS ABOUT AIDS.
supra note 1, at 6.
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death for 53 % of those who are infected. 5 Of all the people who were
diagnosed as having the AIDS disease by the end of 1985, more than
85% had died by the end of the following year. 6
Although the AIDS virus is transmitted primarily by sexual contact, 7 the virus is also spread by the sharing of intravenous needles and
through the transfusion of blood or blood components. 8 A pregnant
woman who is infected with the AIDS virus may transmit the virus to
her unborn child. 19 While it does not appear that the virus can be
transmitted through casual contact,2" health care workers have been
advised to take special precautions to avoid needlestick injuries. 2 Still,
such workers are not perceived as being subject to a high risk of contracting the disease. One recent study indicated that "among [the]
many thousands of people caring for AIDS patients, only nine have
become infected with HIV so far." 2 2
At present there is no test for diagnosing AIDS, but there is a test
for detecting the presence of antibodies to the AIDS virus.2 3 A serious
problem associated with this diagnostic test is the relatively high number of false-positive test results.2 4 This lack of reliability should serve as
a cautionary note to those who interpret and act upon such test resuits. 2 5 Care must be taken to insure that confidentiality and accurate
explanations accompany all preliminary diagnoses in order to avoid inflicting unnecessary distress upon the tested individual.
Despite the lack of certainty associated with the AIDS antibody
test, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services warns that
"[a]nyone who tests positive [for AIDS antibodies] should be considered potentially capable of spreading the virus to others."26 One commentator has suggested:
Carriers of the AIDS virus . . .[who] have not developed AIDS are of
far greater importance than persons with AIDS because (1) people in
the former group are approximately fifty to one hundred times as numer15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Comment, supra note 14, at 531.
Osborn, supra note 2, at 43.
FACTS ABOUT AIDS, supra note 1, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Barnes, AIDS: Statistics but Few Answers, 236 SCIENCE 1423, 1424 (1987).

23.
24.

FACTS ABOUT AIDS, supra note 1, at 6.
AIDS Issues: Devastating Findings, US. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 23, 1987, at 68.

A false-positive test result indicates the presence of an infection when no infection actually exists.
Id. Dr. Mervyn Silverman, the president of the American Foundation for AIDS Research, observed that "[t]hese mistakes can have devastating emotional and public health consequences." Id.
25. Id.
26.

FACTS ABOUT AIDS, supra note 1,at 6.
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ous; (2) their blood tends to contain greater concentrations of virus; and
(3) being asymptomatic, they are more likely to be unaware of their infections, and consequently pose a greater danger of unknowing transmission of the virus to others."
The distinction between those who carry the virus and those who
actually have the disease is a critical one.2" However, it is important to
remember that the discrimination against those who are infected with
the AIDS virus can be just as intense as the discrimination against
those who actually have the AIDS disease. 9
Not all individuals who are infected with the AIDS virus develop
the disease.30 Statistics vary on the number of individuals who will progress from infection with the AIDS virus to a "full-blown" case of
AIDS.3 1 The incubation period, the time between infection with the
virus and the onset of the AIDS disease,3 2 lies somewhere between six
months and seven years. 3
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates
that within five years after infection, 30% of those individuals with the
AIDS virus manifest signs of illness.3 4 Symptoms include: "tiredness,
fever, loss of appetite and weight, diarrhea, night sweats, and swollen
glands (lymph nodes)-usually in the neck, armpits, or groin."' 35 In
some individuals the AIDS virus invades the nervous system and causes
brain damage. 36 One physician has observed:
Over time some AIDS patients also develop confusion and other
signs of progressive neurologic degeneration that may be caused by additional opportunistic microorganisms or, as we now know, by the new virus itself. By whichever dismal route, a diagnosis of full-blown AIDS
means a relentlessly downhill clinical course; and it creates in the patients' environs a social and psychological distortion that has not been
experienced on a large scale since3 7 the days of polio and that is indeed
reminiscent of the era of leprosy.
Such forecasts fuel the aggressive reactions of both the medical

27. Robinson, supra note 3, at 92-93.
28. See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
29. Osborn, supra note 2, at 44; see also Freedman, supra note 6, at 37 ("the trauma
experienced by AIDS victims or carriers of the HTLV-III virus is intensified by their fear that
their condition, if disclosed, will result in the loss of fundamental liberties.").
30. FACTS ABOUT AIDS. supra note I, at 3.
31. Barnes, supra note 22, at 1424.
32. Robinson, supra note 3, at 92.
33. FACTS ABOUT AIDS, supra note I, at 4.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Robinson, supra note 3, at 93.
37. Osborn, supra note 2, at 44.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss3/4
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and legal communities in their efforts to slow the spread of this disease.
The legal community recognizes that it possesses few weapons to combat the transmission of this disease.3" As one commentator noted:
It is fully realized that the efficacy of the criminal law in the effort to
stem the rate of AIDS virus transmission is likely to be relatively limited. . . .Nevertheless, we must do what we can, for each AIDS case
prevented will not only avoid much private misery and public expense,
but it will also save human life.3 9
B.

Liability at Common Law for Transmission of Disease

Imposing criminal sanctions upon those individuals who knowingly
transmit a contagious disease is not a new idea.40 In the 1867 English
case of Regina v. Sinclair,'1 for example, an individual was sentenced
to a year in prison for infecting a twelve-year-old girl with gonorrhea. 2
The court reasoned that although the girl may have consented to the
act of sexual intercourse, her consent was ineffective, because she was
unaware of the defendant's condition."3 Therefore the defendant was
adjudged to be guilty of assault.4 The Sinclair court relied upon the
1866 case of Regina v. Bennett45 for the proposition that "fraud vitiates
consent."'6 In Bennett, the defendant had engaged in sexual intercourse
with his niece without informing her that he had syphilis.' 7 The court
stated:
[11f the prisoner, knowing that he had a foul disease, induced his niece to
sleep with him, intending to possess her, and infected her, she being ignorant of his condition, any consent which she may have given would be
4
vitiated, and the prisoner would be guilty of an indecent assault.
As these two cases indicate, the English courts initially chose to
protect the unsuspecting victim in the context of sexually transmitted
diseases.
9
Twenty years later, though, the court in The Queen v. Clarence4
repudiated Bennett and Sinclair. The Clarence court observed that the

38. Robinson, supra note 3, at 105.
39. Id.
40. See Lynch, Criminal Liability for Transmitting Disease, 1978 CRIM. L. REv. 612,
612-15.
41. 13 Cox C.C. 28 (Eng. 1867).
42. Id. at 28.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 29.
45. 176 Eng. Rep. 925 (W. Cir. Ct. 1866).
46. Id. at 925.
47. Id.
48. Id.
Published49.
by eCommons,
22 Q.B.D. 23 1987
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statement that "consent obtained by fraud is not consent at all, is not
true as a general proposition either in fact or in law."' 50 However, Clarence is distinguishable from both Bennett and Sinclair in that the man
and woman involved in Clarence were married.51 One of the members
of the Clarence court indicated the importance of this particular factor
in his opinion:
At marriage the wife consents to the husband exercising the marital
[privilege]. . . .The utmost the Crown can say is that the wife would
have withdrawn her consent if she knew what her husband knew, or, in
other words, that the husband is guilty of a crime, viz., an assault, because he did not inform the wife of what he then knew. In my judgment
in this case, the consent given at marriage still existing and unrevoked,
the prisoner has not assaulted his wife.52
Hence, the Clarence court was unwilling to find that an assault had
been committed upon the wife, in part, because they saw her consent as
3
being implied in law.5
Unlike English courts, courts in the United States examining liability for transmission of contagious diseases have not denied a wife a
cause of action against her husband solely on the basis of the marital
relationship. In State v. Lankford,54 for example, a Delaware trial
court had instructed the jury that "[a] husband may commit an assault
and battery upon his wife, notwithstanding the marriage relation. ' 55 At
issue in Lankford was whether the defendant knew he had syphilis at
the time he had sexual intercourse with his wife. 6 While knowledge
was an issue of fact for the jury, consent and intent were matters of
law upon which the court ruled. 57 The court stated:
A wife in confiding her person to her husband does not consent to cruel
treatment, or to infection with a loathsome disease. A husband, therefore, knowing that he has such a disease, and concealing the fact from
his wife, by accepting her consent, and communicating the infection to
her, inflicts on her physical abuse, and injury, resulting in great bodily
harm; and he becomes, notwithstanding his marital rights, guilty of an
assault, and indeed, a completed battery. ...
If the accused knew he was infected with syphilis, and his infection
was unknown to his wife, the intent to communicate the disease to her by

50. Id. at 27.
51. Id. at 25.
52. Id. at 37 (Smith, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 25.
54. 29 Del. (I Boyce) 594, 102 A. 63 (1917).
55. Id. at -,
102 A. at 64.
56. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss3/4
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having sexual intercourse with her, may be inferred from the actual
results.58

Similar conclusions have been reached by other state courts considering
criminal liability for sexually transmitted
diseases, both in and out of
59
the confines of a marital relationship.
Examples of the imposition of liability for transmission of disease
are not limited to cases involving venereal diseases, 0 nor are they limited to the criminal context."' In fact, many civil suits have been
brought against individuals accused of infecting others with a contagious disease.6 2 Recently, civil actions have also been brought against
individuals who allegedly infected their partners with genital herpes.63
In Maharam v. Maharam," a New York appellate court held that
a wife could maintain a cause of action against her husband in either
fraud or negligence for wrongful transmission of genital herpes.6 5 The
Maharam court considered many of the same issues discussed in the
venereal-disease context, and raised several questions pertinent to an
analysis of liability for transmission of the AIDS virus.66 For example,
the Maharam court considered issues of causation,6 7 compulsory physi69
cal examinations, 8 and the statute of limitations.
In an unreported Illinois case with facts similar to
those in
Maharam, the Circuit Court of Appeals for Cook County ruled that a
woman could maintain a cause of action against her boyfriend for neg-

.58. Id. (citation omitted).
59. See, e.g., State v. Marcks, 140 Mo. 656, 657, 43 S.W. 1095, 1097 (1897) (rape conviction upheld because woman's consent to sexual intercourse was vitiated by defendant's fraudulent
concealment of his infection with gonorrhea); Ex Parte Brown, 770 Okla. Crim. 96, __, 139 P.2d
196, 196 (1943) (criminal liability for exposing another to venereal disease); Epps v. State, 69
Okla. Crim. 460, -, 104 P.2d 262, 263 (1910) (criminal liability for communicating venereal
disease to spouse).
60. See, e.g., Franklin v. Butcher, 144 Mo. App. 660, 669, 129 S.W. 428, 435 (1910) (criminal liability for transmission of smallpox); Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 474-75, 98 A.2d
107, 109 (1953) (criminal liability for negligent transmission of tuberculosis).
61. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 14, at 535-49.
62. See Marcks, 140 Mo. at 677, 43 S.W. at 1097 (criminal liability for transmission of
gonorrhea upheld where defendant knew of his infection at time of intercourse); Reynolds v.
State, 49 Okla. 215, _, 292 P. 1046, 1047 (1930) (defendant found criminally liable for transmitting gonorrhea and syphilis).
63. See, e.g., Reidinger, Negligent Sex, A.B.A. J., April 1, 1987, at 75; Comment, You
Wouldn't Give Me Anything Would You? Tort Liability for Genital Herpes, 20 CAL. W.L. REV.
60, 64-78 (1983); Note, Liability for the Sexual Transmission of Diseases: Genital Herpes and
the Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 117 (1984).
64. 123 A.D.2d 165, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1986).
65. Id. at 170, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
66. Id. at 169-72, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 107-08.
67. Id. at 170, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
68. Id.
Published 69.
by eCommons,
Id. at 171-72,1987
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ligently infecting her with herpes.7" In another decision involving the
transmission of genital herpes, People v. Johnson,7 a California appellate court affirmed the imposition of an enhanced sentence on a convicted rapist for inflicting "great bodily injury" 72 on his victim by infecting her with herpes. The defendant in Johnson argued that "as a
matter of law the transmission of a virus cannot constitute great bodily
injury." 71 The court disagreed, stating that "although the spreading of
a virus is a risk inherent in an act of sexual intercourse, the physical
symptoms resulting from such an infection may form the basis of a
great bodily injury enhancement pursuant to § 12022.B." 7 4 The Johnson court went on to hold that the evidence supported the jury's finding
that the victim suffered great bodily injury. 75 The evidence that the
court considered determinative included the fact that herpes is incurable and the fact that the victim faced the possibility of blindness if the
virus got into her eyes or death if the virus got into her bloodstream.,
Similarly, the transmission of AIDS through rape would require a consideration of the serious consequences that would follow such an attack,
since the "tragic possibilities" discussed in Johnson would be even
more likely to occur if a rape victim contracted AIDS. 77
C. Statutory Provisions
States have not relied solely upon the common law to stem the
flow of disease transmission. 78 Public policy requires that legislatures

70. Both Maharam and this unreported Illinois case are discussed in Reidinger, supra note
63, at 75.
71. '181 Cal. App. 3d 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1986).
72. Id. at 1141, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
73. Id. at 1140, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1140-41, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 12-37 and accompanying text.
78. Many state legislatures have promulgated laws to help set clear guidelines in the area of
sexually-transmitted diseases. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3353 (West 1979)
(transmission of a communicable disease constitutes a misdemeanor); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4401(2) (1982) (transmission of venereal disease constitutes a misdemeanor); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 701-719 (Supp. 1988) (imposing various fines for knowing transmission of venereal disease);
IDAHO CODE § 39-601 (Supp. 1988) (transmission of venereal disease constitutes a misdemeanor);
IOWA CODE § 139.31-32 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988) (transmission of communicable disease
constitutes a misdemeanor); NEV. REV. STAT. § 441.220 (1986) (transmission of venereal or communicable disease constitutes a misdemeanor); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2307 (McKinney 1985)
(transmission of venereal disease constitutes a misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-519
(West 1984) (knowing transmission of venereal disease constitutes a felony); S.C. CODE ANN. §
44-29-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (transmission of venereal disease constitutes a misdemeanor);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23-1 (1986) (transmission of venereal disease constitutes a misdemeanor); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-10-107 (1987) (transmission of venereal disease constitutes a
misdemeanor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-5 (Supp. 1988) (transmission of communicable disease
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss3/4
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also play a key role by passing public health statutes and regulations
designed to prevent the spread of the AIDS disease.7 9 For example, the
court in Maharam utilized a New York public health law that provided
that "[a]ny person who, knowing himself or herself to be infected with
an infectious venereal disease, has sexual intercourse with another shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor. '"80
Various other states have public health statutes which make it a
crime to infect another with a contagious disease.81 Some, like Iowa,
have statutes that speak in general terms of "knowingly expos[ing] another to infection from any communicable disease." 8 2 Others, like Colorado, have statutes which expressly limit criminal liability for a knowing transmission of disease to the transmission of venereal disease.8"
Some states have amended public health statutes to include genital
herpes as a contagious disease for which knowing transmission is declared unlawful.84 Recently, lawmakers have been asked to add the
AIDS virus to the ranks of these diseases. In 1986, bills were introduced in at least seven states to criminalize knowing transmission of
the AIDS virus.85 The proposals include several different scenarios
under which the AIDS virus might be transferred, and provide various
penalties depending upon the circumstances involved.8"

constitutes a misdemeanor).
79. See supra notes 40-77 and accompanying text.
80. Maharam. 123 A.D.2d at 168, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2307).
81. See supra note 78.
82. IOWA CODE § 139.31. ("Any person who knowingly exposes another to infection from
any communicable disease or knowingly subjects another to the danger of contracting such disease
from a child or other irresponsible person, shall be liable for all damages resulting therefrom, and
be punished as provided in this chapter.").
83. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-401(2). This section provides:
Venereal diseases. (1) Syphilis, gonorrhea, chancroid, granuloma inguinale, and lymphogranuloma venerum, referred to in this part 4 as 'venereal diseases,' are declared to be
contagious, infectious, communicable, and dangerous to public health. (2) It is unlawful for
any person who has knowledge or reasonable grounds to suspect that he is infected with a
venereal disease to willfully expose to or infect another with such a disease or to knowingly
perform an act which exposes to or infects another person with a venereal disease.
84. See generally Clark, Herpes: The VD of the 80's, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 12, 1982, at 75,
75-76.
85. See Closen, Connor, Kaufman & Wojcik, AIDS: Testing Democracy-Irrational Responses to the Public Health Crisis and the Need for Privacy in Serologic Testing, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 835, 922 (1986) (noting that bills were introduced to criminalize knowing transmission of the AIDS virus in Colorado, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and
West Virginia); see also Am. H.B. 571, 117th Gen. Assembly, 1988 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-882
(Baldwin) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.13 (Anderson Supp. 1988)).
86. See, e.g.. H.R. 4069, 171st Sess., 1987 N.J. Laws (individual who commits act of
sexual penetration knowing that he or she is infected with AIDS is guilty of third-degree felony);
Am. H.B. 571, supra note 85 (proposing that individual who sells or donates blood for transfusion
knowing
he or she is1987
infected with AIDS virus shall be charged with committing third-degree
Published
bythat
eCommons,
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ANALYSIS

Imposing criminal liability upon an individual for the knowing
transmission of the AIDS virus does not require a major evolutionary
step in the criminal law." Since the turn of the century, legislatures
have required that active measures be taken to restrain the spread of
disease. Today, many states have added genital herpes to laws providing that knowing transmission of a venereal disease is either a misdemeanor or a felony.
Commonly, the charge brought in such instances is that of assault
and battery. Because of the threat of death associated with the contraction of AIDS, the possible charges in a prosecution for knowing transmission of the AIDS virus could include homicide or attempted murder.8" However, numerous problems will be faced by prosecutors
dealing with cases of AIDS transmission, including privacy considerations, problems of proof, and the defense of informed consent.
A.

Privacy Concerns

One argument raised against imposing criminal sanctions upon an
individual for the knowing transmission of AIDS is that the government should not intrude upon the individual's right to privacy in intimate relationships. 89 However, the right to privacy is not absolute. 90 In
the context of contagious disease transmission, public policy demands
that the individual's rights give way to the overriding concern for the
general public's health and safety.9
A California appellate court was faced with this balancing of public and private interests in Kathleen K. v. Robert B.,92 a case in which a
woman sued her former lover for infecting her with genital herpes.9 3
The court noted that an individual's right to privacy is not absolute,
especially where public health and safety are threatened.9 4 This same
concern for public health is even more likely to outweigh individual
privacy considerations in a case involving transmission of the AIDS vi-

felony) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.13).

87. See generally Lynch, supra note 40.
88. See Robinson, supra note 3, at 96-97.
89. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564-68 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
90. Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 380, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 430 (1983)
(woman stated a valid cause of action against her sexual partner for damages resulting from a life
threatening ectopic pregnancy, since her consent to sexual intercourse was fraudulently induced by
partner's knowingly false representation of his sterility).
91. See Lynch, supra note 40, at 612-15.
92. 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
93. Id. at 994, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
94. Id. at 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss3/4
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rus, given the deadly nature of the disease.9 5 In fact, in Kathleen K.,
the court specifically mentioned AIDS in a footnote:
We are not inclined to bar appellant's cause of action on the basis that
genital herpes is not a venereal disease. It is a disease that can be propagated by sexual contact. Like AIDS it is now known to the public to be a
contagious and dreadful disease. At the core of this action is the misrepresentation of the defendant that he did not have a contagious disease
that could be passed to his partner. If a person knowingly has genital
herpes, AIDS or some other contagious and serious disease, a limited
representation that he or she does not have a venereal disease is no defense to this type of action.98
One commentator has argued that, in the AIDS context, a court faced
with a choice between protecting an individual's privacy rights and the
public's health and welfare should choose to protect the latter:
Whereas the right [to privacy] should remain in effect to keep the judiciary from intruding into the private, consensual sexual conduct of parties
and the natural consequences flowing therefrom, it should not be available as an affirmative defense to shield defendants from liability for
spreading the AIDS virus merely because it was contracted during the
97
sexual contact.
Even within the constitutionally guarded realm of the family, 98 courts
have not allowed privacy concerns to outweigh a wife's right to bring
charges against her husband for injuries arising from sexual relations. 99
Recognizing this, courts should not always be compelled to elevate the
rights of an individual above the needs of society.10 0
Other dimensions of the constitutional right to privacy may also
arise when individuals are prosecuted for the transmission of AIDS.
Such considerations include the constitutionality of compulsory physical examinations ° 1 and blood tests,10 2 and the assurances of confidentiality required before disclosure of the results of these tests will be
allowed. 0 3

95. One commentator has noted that "[n]o AIDS patient has ever recovered. Eighty percent
die within two years of diagnosis." Freedman, supra note 6, at 36.
96. Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 996 n.3, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276 n.3.
97. Baruch, AIDS in the Courts: Tort Liability for the Sexual Transmission of Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 165, 188 (1987).
98. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965).
99. See State v. Lankford, 29 Del. (I Boyce) 594, -,
102 A. 63, 64 (1917).
100. See Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
101. See Weisenhaus, AIDS Criminal Laws, Cases Rise, Nat'l L.J., July 20, 1987, at 32,
col. 2.
102. Id.
103. Lacayo, supra note 1I, at 63 (noting that "many state[] ... confidentiality laws forbid the disclosure of AIDS test results without the [prior] written consent of the person tested.").
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In the Maharam v. Maharam 4 divorce action, the husband was
compelled to disclose the results of the physical examination conducted
to determine whether or not he was afflicted with genital herpes." 5 In
the criminal context, courts have been reluctant to compel a defendant
to undergo physical examinations that include blood tests.' 06 In Barlow
v. Superior Court,' for example, the defendant was initially charged
with battery against police officers and resisting arrest. 0 8 The municipal court issued a search warrant, sought by the prosecution to obtain
evidence to show an intent to kill the bitten officers, authorizing the
drawing of blood from the suspect for the purpose of testing for the
presence of AIDS antibodies." 9 The appellate court held that the
search warrant was invalid, in part, because "the taking of the blood
could not disclose evidence of crime as disclosure of results of tests of
blood for AIDS antibodies is flatly prohibited by law." 1 0 The appellate
court declined to find an exception to this disclosure rule in the health
and safety statutes, stating that "[w]hile some cultures require a leper
to ring a bell to warn the passerby, our Legislature has not so stigmatized the victims of AIDS. Our skies are not black with smoke from
cities burned to prevent the spread of plague.""' Presumably, no one
desires that those already suffering from AIDS be further castigated by
onerous disclosure requirements." 2 However, in a situation like that in
Barlow, where a defendant has taunted others about his or her physical
condition," 3 disclosure may not be so onerous. In such situations,
courts must balance competing interests in light of the peculiar circumstances present in each case.
B.

Problems of Proof

Another reason why the appellate court in Barlow questioned the
validity of the search warrant authorizing the drawing of the defendant's blood was that
the affidavit [did] not support a finding of probable cause to believe the
taking of the blood and the test results [would] reveal evidence of an
element of the asserted crime, i.e., Barlow's intent to kill the officers or

104. 123 A.D.2d 165, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1986).
105. Id. at 169, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
106. Galante, AIDS Expanding Legal Frontier, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 3, 1986, at 3, col. I.
107. 190 Cal. App. 3d 1652, 236 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1987), review denied and ordered not to
be officially published by California Supreme Court Order of May 26, 1987.
108. Id. at -, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
109. Id.
110. Id. at
, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
111. Id. at - , 236 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
112. See Lacayo, supra note 1I, at 63.
113. Barlow, 190 Cal. App. 3d at -,
236 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
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to inflict great bodily injury upon them in the course of the assault. 1 "
The court ruled that such a blood test, taken five weeks after the biting
incident, would not be evidence of Barlow's knowledge as to whether he
carried the AIDS virus at the time of the biting, and, therefore, would
not be relevant to show intent.' 15
Proving knowledge, intent, and causation are heavy burdens in the
prosecution of an individual accused of the knowing transmission of a
disease. In the venereal disease and herpes context, it is very difficult to
prove such elements." 6 However, in the AIDS context, these problems
of proof are further exacerbated by the particular factors surrounding
the transmission of the virus,"" and the long and varying incubation
periods between infection and development of AIDS." 8 As one commentator has concluded, "[p]roving that a particular individual was the
source of the contagion, together with the additional requirement of
showing culpability (mens rea), would make successful prosecution impossible in the great majority of situations."" 9 There are some occasions where the prosecutor's burden is lightened by a perpetrator who
announces his or her intentions for all to hear, but these occasions are
120
rare.
In Maharam, the husband argued that it would be practically impossible, as a matter of law, for his wife to prove that the only possible
way she could have contracted genital herpes was through relations
with him.' 2 ' The court disagreed, finding Mrs. Maharam had raised a
substantial issue of fact as to causation that would have to be resolved
by the trier of fact. 2 2 In the AIDS context, causation could be even
more difficult to prove, because "[m]ost of the victims of AIDS have
23
engaged in multiple high-risk activities.'
Problems of proof are lessened when one who carries the AIDS
virus and knowingly risks infecting others 2 " is charged with attempted
murder. 2 51 One commentator has observed:

114. Id. at -, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 40-77 and accompanying text.
117. See generally Robinson, supra note 3, at 95.
118. Baruch, supra note 97, at 192.
119. Robinson, supra note 3, at 97.
120. Comment, supra note 14, at 92 n.67.
121. Maharam, 123 A.D.2d at 171, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
122. Id. at 171, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 108.
123. Robinson, supra note 3, at 96-97.
124. See id. at 97.
125. For the charge of attempted murder to stand, it must be shown that the defendant
intended to cause the death of another. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 501 (2d ed.
1986).
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Unlike the homicide offenses, proof of death of the victim, cause of
death, or even transmission of the virus would not be required [in the
case of an attempted murder charge]. Under traditional attempt law,
however, a true purpose
to kill would have to be shown, and this could
126
not often be done.
Traditionally, the purpose of attempt law has been to sanction
those individuals who have demonstrated their propensity for danger.12 7
It has been noted that "the law of attempts exists because there is just
as much need to stop, deter and reform a person who has unsuccessfully attempted or is attempting to commit a crime than one who has
already committed such an offence." '28 Such a rationale was behind
the recent filing of attempted murder charges by the Los Angeles prosecutors' office against a man accused of being a homosexual prostitute.1 29 The information alleged that the defendant had sold his blood
and engaged in prostitution even though he knew that he was infected
with the AIDS virus.1 30 The judge dismissed the attempted murder
charges, maintaining that the prosecution had failed to show that the
defendant had a specific intent to commit murder. 3 ' The judge did
find, however, that there was sufficient evidence to try the defendant on
1 32
two counts of attempted poisoning.
In other instances, specific intent may be easier to show. For example, an incident occurred in Columbia, South Carolina, in which a
suspect "claimed to have AIDS and vowed to spread it before allegedly
attacking a young woman. ' 133 In this case, the prosecution added an
assault and battery with intent to kill charge to the rape charge already
pending against the defendant.1 34 Yet, even where such direct evidence
of intent is not available, the trier of fact may be able to infer intent
from the actual results. In State v. Lankford, 35 the defendant husband
13 6
was found guilty of communicating a venereal disease to his wife.
The court ruled that if the husband knew he had syphilis while the wife
was ignorant of this fact, his intent to transmit the disease to her

126. Id. (footnote omitted).
127. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, supra note 125, at 495.
128. Stuart, The Actus Reus in Attempts, 1970 CRIM. L. REV.
505, 511.
129. Deutsch, Court Cases Won't Stop AIDS, Ethicist Argues, Dayton Daily News & J.
Herald, July 6, 1987, at 20, col. I.
130. Id.
131. Judge: AIDS Man Didn't Mean to Kill, Dayton Daily News & J. Herald, Dec. 2,
1987, at 2, col. 1.
132. Id.
133. Lacayo, supra note 11,at 63.
134. Id.
135. 29 Del. (I Boyce) 594, 102 A. 63 (1917).
136. Id. at -,
102 A. at 64.
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through sexual intercourse could be inferred from the fact that she did
contract syphilis. 137 Similarly, a victim's contraction of the AIDS virus
from someone who knew he or she was infected with the virus should
be enough to show that the transmitter intended to communicate the
virus.
In United States v. Moore,'38 the United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota effectively lessened the prosecution's burden
of proof in a criminal AIDS-transmission case.1 39 Moore, who had
tested positive for exposure to the AIDS virus, was an inmate at a federal medical center.'4 Moore bit two guards and was convicted of two
counts of assault with a deadly or dangerous weapon-his mouth and
teeth." The defendant argued that the evidence failed to show beyond
a reasonable doubt that AIDS could be transmitted by a human bite," 2
and that the government had therefore failed to prove that the human
mouth and teeth are a deadly or dangerous weapon." The court stated
that the issue of whether the mouth and teeth can be a dangerous
weapon is an issue of fact for the jury,""' and that the jury was not
required to find that AIDS could be transmitted by a human bite in
order to find that the defendant was guilty of assault with a deadly
weapon.' 4"
The Moore court did not find the issues of knowledge and intent to
be problematic, because a month before the biting incident, the prisoner was told that he had the AIDS virus,4 6 "that he was infectious,
and that he should avoid intimate contact with others such as sexual
contact, the sharing of needles, the sharing of razors or toothbrushes
and the like." 14 7 There was also evidence that during the attack Moore
said he was going to kill the guards; 4 8 three days after the incident, he
allegedly "stated that he meant to kill the officers when he bit them,
that he hoped that they got the disease he had, and that when he got
out of seclusion he would kill McCullough first and then get the other
officers.""" The court concluded, based upon these facts, that there was

137. Id.
138. 669 F. Supp. 289 (D. Minn. 1987), affd, 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988).
139. 669 F. Supp. at 290.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. Government's Response to Defendant's Motion for a New Trial and Motion for Judgment Acquittal at 8, Moore.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict.' 50 The Moore
decision demonstrates that the prosecution's problems of proof can be
overcome, and that the act of trying to use a disease as a weapon is
punishable by law.
C. Defenses
Because of the sometimes lengthy incubation period between exposure and actual development of AIDS,' 5 ' defendants may be able to
successfully challenge the sufficiency of the proof of causation.' 5 2 Additionally, in the civil context, the statute of limitations may act as a bar
to a claim against a defendant. 53 One commentator has observed that
"[d]ue to the long incubation period, in some cases approaching seven
years, it is very likely that the AIDS plaintiff will be unaware of the
actual negligence until after the statutory period has expired."'" 4 In the
criminal context, the incubation period' 5 5 and the manner of transmission of the AIDS virus'5 " compound the problems of proof generally
57
present in contagious-disease transmission cases.'
The consent defense is often problematic in prosecutions for sexually transmitted diseases.' 58 In an early English case, The Queen v.
Clarence,'5 9 the court refused to find that the husband committed an
assault upon his wife, even though he had sexual intercourse with her
without informing her that he had gonorrhea.'
The court's refusal
was based on the fact that the wife had consented to the act of intercourse,16' and, thus, had waived her right to maintain a cause of action
against her husband. 2 In 1978 one commentator suggested that Clarence might be ripe for overruling. 63 Yet, in 1985, another commentator cited Clarence for the proposition that consent might be a valid
defense in instances where a contagious disease has been transmitted
via sexual contact.' 64

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Moore, 669 F. Supp. at 290.
See generally Robinson, supra note 3, at 95-105.
Cf. Baruch, supra note 97, at 188.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114-50 and accompanying text.
See Lynch, supra note 40, at 615-19.
22 Q.B.D. 23 (1888).
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id.
Lynch, supra note 40; at 621.
See Robinson, supra note 3, at 97 n.58.
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In this country, consent has not been recognized as a valid defense
in cases involving knowing transmission of venereal disease165 or genital
herpes."'6 Thus, it is unlikely that consent would be a viable defense in
cases involving the knowing transmission of the AIDS virus. 6 ' In
Lankford, for example, the court ruled that a wife could consent to
having sexual relations with her husband without also consenting to
contract syphilis from those relations. 6 Therefore, the husband could
be found guilty of committing assault and battery upon his wife if,
while concealing his illness, he engaged in sexual intercourse with
her. 6 9 In Crowell v. Crowell, 70° a case with facts similar to those in
Lankford, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a wife's consent was abrogated by her husband's conduct. The court concluded:
It must be remembered that there is not, and never has been, any
statute in England or this state declaring that "husband and wife are
one, and he is that one." It was an inference drawn by courts in a barbarous age, based on the wife being a chattel and therefore without any
right to property or person. It has always been disregarded by courts of
equity, and public opinion and the sentiment of the age, as expressed by
all laws and constitutional provisions since, have been against it. The
anomalous instances of that conception which still survive are due to
courts construing away the changes made by corrective legislation or restricting their application.
Whether a man has laid open his wife's head with a bludgeon, put
out her eye, broken her arm, or poisoned her body, he is no longer exempt from liability to her on the ground that he vowed at the altar to
"love, cherish and protect" her. We have progressed that far in civiliza7
tion and justice.'

1

Furthermore, in Kathleen K., a more recent case involving unmarindividuals, a California appellate court refused to recognize
consent as a valid defense in an action brought by a woman against her
former lover for infecting her with genital herpes. 173 The court stated:
ried172

[A] certain amount of trust and confidence exists in any intimate relationship, at least to the extent that one sexual partner represents to the
other that he or she is free from venereal or other dangerous contagious
disease. The basic premise underlying these old cases--consent to sexual

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See, e.g., Lankford, 29 Del. (I Boyce) at -,
102 A. at 64.
See, e.g., Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
Cf Note, supra note 63, at 128.
Lankford, 29 Del. (1 Boyce) at __, 102 A. at 64.
Id.
180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920).
Id. at
, 105 S.E. at 210.
Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
Id. at 997, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276-77.
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intercourse vitiated by one partner's fraudulent concealment of the risk
of infection with venereal disease-is equally applicable today, whether
or not the partners involved are married to each other.174
It is sound policy to deny a defendant the right to assert a consent
defense when that consent was not informed. The burden to warn one's
partner adequately about one's condition should be on the individual
infected with the disease or virus. In the absence of such warning, an
innocent victim should not be held to have consented to contract a disease merely because he or she chose to engage in intimate relations.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Many states have adopted misdemeanor or felony statutes proscribing the transmission of a venereal disease. 175 However, given the
gravity of the AIDS epidemic, a statute specifically directed towards
criminalizing the knowing transfer of the AIDS virus is advosan;e to
provide law enforcement officers with clear guidance in this complex
area.1 78 So far, a dozen states have considered AIDS-related legislative
proposals.1 77 Soon, other state legislatures will also be asked to provide
for penalties against those who knowingly transmit this potentially fatal
virus.178 Many people oppose such legislation 79 because they anticipate
that it will reinforce public fear and hatred of AIDS victims.' 80 However, in reality, prosecution of those believed to have knowingly transmitted the virus will increase with or without AIDS-specific legislation. 18' Rather than adding to the hysteria surrounding AIDS,
carefully-crafted laws will help to ensure that clearly delineated, rational guidelines are available to protect both the victim and the
accused.
Legislation to criminalize transmission of the AIDS virus must
clearly describe the behaviors that are prohibited to avoid a constitutional challenge on the grounds of vagueness.1 8' Additionally, vague-

174. Id.
175. Prentice & Murray, Liability for Transmission of Herpes: Using Traditional Tort
Principles to Encourage Honesty in Sexual Relationships, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 67, 100 n.215
(1984).
176. See Transcript of the University of Dayton Symposium on AIDS (March 1, 1988)
[hereinafter Symposium] (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review).
177. See Weisenhaus, supra note 101, at 32, col. 2.
178. See generally Lacayo, supra note 11, at 63.
179. Freedman, supra note 6, at 37.
180. Id.
181. Symposium, supra note 176 (Dennis Lieberman, prominent criminal defense attorney
in Dayton, Ohio, argued that there will be "more and more convictions" in this area because it
will be easy for prosecutors to "play on the mass hysteria of the jury").
182. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-14 (1972) (enunciating constitutional
standards for withstanding vagueness challenge).
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ness in the law would make the prosecutor's task-a task already laden
with heavy evidentiary burdens-even more difficult.18 David Robinson, Jr., a professor of law at George Washington University, has proposed a statutory scheme for criminalizing activities that are likely to
result in the transfer of the AIDS virus. 84 His proposal allows for an
offense to be charged if someone "purposely, knowingly or recklessly
transfers or attempts to transfer any of his bodily fluid to another person," provided that the individual actually knows that he or she has the
AIDS virus.18 5 By making the transfer of suspect bodily fluids' 86 the
criminal act, Robinson's proposal eliminates the problems which are
inherent in showing that a defendant actually attempted to transmit
the virus to another.18 7 However, Robinson's list of suspect bodily fluids
is controversial, especially since it includes saliva-a substance that has
not been proven to be an effective vehicle for transmission of the AIDS
virus.'8 8 Still, after United States v. Moore, 8 ' it would appear that the
a defendant's belief that he or she could transmit the virus through
biting someone might be enough to impose criminal liability.' 90
Another key factor in Robinson's draft is the specific exclusion of
consent as a defense in a prosecution for transmission of substances
which may contain the AIDS virus.' 9' This important issue should be
addressed in any AIDS-related criminal statute; otherwise, the defendant will attempt to argue that his or her partner consented to engage in
the act which gave rise to the injury.' 92
A workable statute imposing criminal liability for attempted or actual transmission of the AIDS virus must also require knowledge on the
part of the transferor that he or she carries the virus. Furthermore, the
statute must delineate the required level of culpability relating to the
transfer; that is, must the transferor actually intend to transfer the virus, or may he be found guilty if he merely knows or should know that
he is capable of transmitting the virus? Even a well-drafted statute
with a clear definitional section will not be sufficient, if certain evidentiary matters regarding privacy and the disclosure of blood tests are not
considered in a light more favorable to the government. Certainly, indi-

183. See supra notes 89-150 and accompanying text.
184. Robinson, supra note 3, at 100.
185. Id. at 101.
186. In Robinson's proposal, "[blodily fluid includes semen (irrespective of the presence of
spermatozoa), blood, saliva, vaginal secretion, urine, and fecal material." Id.
187. See supra notes 114-50 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
189. 669 F. Supp. 289 (D. Minn. 1987), afl'd, 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988).
190. See id. at 290.
191. Robinson, supra note 3, at 101.
192. See supra notes 158-74 and accompanying text.
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viduals should not be compelled to sacrifice their fundamental right to
privacy and self-determination. Yet, it is imperative that some sort of
balance be struck between the rights of individuals to keep certain information to themselves and the right of others to protect themselves.
V.

CONCLUSION

While AIDS is first and foremost a medical problem, it does not
seem likely that science can offer a solution to this problem in the near
future. 193 Thus, it is incumbent upon legislators and courts to take
what steps they can to inhibit the spread of the disease. Critics of those
who propose AIDS legislation argue that such laws delude people into
thinking that the AIDS epidemic can be brought under control through
legal means.' 94 Such a view presumes that the legalists themselves are
deluded, and so they would be, if they actually believed this disease
could be controlled through laws alone. The reality, though, is that a
solution requires input from many sources in our society, and the legal
system does have something to offer. Scientists recognize that they cannot combat the problem alone. As one commentator astutely observed:
We have established to an irrefutable degree that behavioral aberrations
such as promiscuity or intravenous drug abuse underlie most of our problem and are common social phenomena in our society; but we have also
demonstrated convincingly that we are not currently as well equipped to
deal with social issues as we are with molecular genetics. As the epidemic continues to unfold, public health officials will have to make major
efforts to deal with the social and behavioral causes and consequences of
AIDS. The success of containment strategies rests largely in our ability
to communicate health information with sufficient persuasiveness to affect and modify human behavior. Failure to do so may have ominous
consequences for us all.' 95
Behavior modification is a worthwhile goal of the criminal justice system, "96
' and a goal which must be vigorously pursued in this particular
context. While lawmakers are limited in what they can do to alleviate
the suffering brought about by the AIDS epidemic, this does not relieve
them of their responsibility for doing what they can to contain the
spread of the disease. If the threat of criminal prosecution elevates the

193.

Galante, supra note 106, at 3, col. 1.

194.

Deutsch, supra note 129, at 20, col. 1.

Osborn, supra note 2, at 55.
196. See W. LAFAVE & A SCOTT, supra note 125, at 24.
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consciousness of those capable of harming others through transmission
of this virus, so that they forego dangerous activity, then the law will
have achieved its goal.
Sallyanne K. Sullivan
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